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Abstract
Regulations that require asset issuers to disclose payo-relevant information to potential
buyers sound like obvious measures to increase investor welfare. But in many cases, such regu-
lations harm investors. In an equilibrium model, asset returns compensate investors for risk. By
making payos less uncertain, disclosure reduces risk and therefore reduces return. As high-risk,
high-return investments disappear, investor welfare falls. Of course, information is still valuable
to each individual investor. But acquiring information is like a prisoners' dilemma. Each in-
vestor is better o with the information, but collectively investors are better o if they remain
uninformed. The only cases in which providing information improves investors' welfare are ones
where there would otherwise be severe asymmetric information. Using a model of information
markets, the paper explores when such outcomes are likely to arise. When we extend the model
so that nancial markets with information allocate the real capital stock more eciently, these
conclusions do not change. Disclosure improves eciency, but more ecient rms do not have
more risk and therefore do not oer investors higher return. Instead, they simply command a
higher price, which only benets the asset issuer. Since the eciency gains are fully internalized
by asset issuers, who can choose to disclose without disclosure being mandatory, the eciency
argument is not a logical rationale for regulation.
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Regulations that require asset issuers to disclose payo-relevant information to potential buyers
sound like obvious measures to increase investor welfare. This paper builds a new model with an
equilibrium asset market, an information market and a real production sector to investigate whether
such information regulations improve investor welfare. We nd that in many cases, requiring
information disclosure harms investors. The reason is that asset returns compensate investors for
risk. By making payos less uncertain, disclosure reduces risk and therefore reduces return. As
high-risk, high-return investments disappear, investor welfare falls. Of course, information is still
valuable to each individual investor. But acquiring information is like a prisoners' dilemma. Each
investor is better o with the information, but collectively investors are better o if they remain
uninformed. The only cases in which providing information improves investors' welfare are ones
where there would otherwise be information asymmetry. The paper explores when such outcomes
are likely to arise.
Many recent nancial reforms have sought to increase the transparency of nancial products
by requiring the seller to disclose additional information.1 Proponents of these reforms argue that
giving buyers more information about the expected costs and benets of a nancial product in-
creases their welfare, and allows the nancial market to allocate capital more eciently. Opponents
point out that disclosure is costly for rms and that an active market for nancial information and
consulting services exists to provide this information in cases where it is ecient. We show why
neither argument is correct. Although the free-market eciency argument is intuitively appealing,
our model highlights the free-rider problems, spillovers to real investment, and other externalities
that make information market outcomes inecient. Similarly, we show that while information can
improve the allocation of capital, that does not translate into a rationale for mandatory disclosure.
Literatures in economics, nance, and accounting consider how disclosures remedy managers'
incentive problems in principal-agent settings. But to examine market externalities and evaluate
the merits of free-market eciency claims requires a model with many agents interacting in a
market. Therefore, we use a standard noisy-rational-expectations asset market with a continuum
of agents as our foundation. On top of this foundation, we build a new framework that allows us
to analyze equilibrium eects of regulation in information markets, its eects on asset markets,
1For example, Title X, section 1032 of the Dodd-Frank act of 2010 requires that features of consumer nancial
products, such as credit cards or insurance, are clearly disclosed to the consumer. Title IV, section 404 requires
that hedge funds must disclose their leverage, types of assets held, trading practices, etc. Title IX, section 942
requires that the issuers of asset-backed securities disclose asset composition and risk-retention of originators. Title
XIV, section 1419 requires that mortgage lenders disclose fees, total interest, and maximum payments. Title IV of
the Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002 increased the amount of nancial information that publicly traded corporations are
required to disclose.
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and the spillover eects on the real economy, all in an analytically tractable way. In our model,
information can be produced at a cost. This cost can be borne by the issuer of a security, who
discloses the information, free of charge, to all potential investors, or by independent analysts who
can produce the information and sell it to each investor. After observing issuer or analyst reports,
rational investors choose how much to pay for the security. After all shares are sold at a market-
clearing price, the payo of the security is realized and agents get utility payos. The policy we
evaluate in the model is a mandatory disclosure regulation, which requires asset issuers to provide
the information at their own cost.
Section 2 begins by considering the welfare eects of an exogenous change in the amount of
symmetric information investors observe. Information aects asset prices in two ways: First, a
surprisingly positive report will push the price of the asset up, while a surprisingly positive report
will reduce the price. In expectation, reports are neutral and this eect washes out. The second
eect is that information makes the asset's payo less uncertain. In doing so, it makes the asset less
risky. Lowering risk lowers the equilibrium return and systematically raises the asset's price. For
welfare, this means that on the one hand, information reduces the risk investors face when buying
an asset. On the other hand, lower risk implies lower return. We show that, with exponential
utility and normally distributed payos, the return eect always dominates. The conclusion is that
requiring rms to disclose information that no investors would otherwise know makes investors
worse o.
There are some circumstances in which mandatory disclosure can improve investor welfare.
Since mandatory disclosure shifts information costs from investors to asset issuers, one might think
that disclosure would be most valuable when this cost is large. Ironically, investors only benet from
disclosure when the cost of information is low. If the information in analyst reports is expensive, few
investors will buy the reports. Since there is little information asymmetry, the eect of disclosure is
similar to the previous case where information is symmetric and more information reduces investor
welfare. But when the analyst reports are cheap, many investors buy them. Any remaining
uninformed investors face severe asymmetric information, which reduces risk-sharing. Disclosure
can remedy this distortion. If analyst reports are so cheap that all investors choose to purchase
them, then prices and allocations are identical to those in an economy with mandatory disclosure,
except that the (small) cost of information is borne by investors instead of by the issuer.
Together, these results reveal that mandatory disclosure is not warranted simply because in-
vestors are poorly-informed about a security. To the contrary, the case for regulating nancial
information, as an investor protection measure, hinges on establishing that either a) some investors
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have this information already or b) all investors already expend resources to acquire this informa-
tion. In the rst case, mandatory disclosure remedies distortions from asymmetric information. In
the second case, it simply shifts information costs from investors on to asset issuers. If instead,
all investors lack information about the asset's payos, then a higher asset return will compensate
them for this uncertainty and mandatory disclosure can reduce their welfare.
Section 3 uses the model's information market structure to investigate what kinds of assets are
most likely to suer from asymmetric information. This tells us: For which assets would investors
benet from mandating that issuers disclose payo information? The intuitive answer, that one
should target the assets whose payos are most uncertain, turns out to be incorrect. When prior
beliefs are very uncertain, either asset issuers or investors will opt to purchase information, even
without regulatory mandates. Conversely, when prior beliefs are very precise, information will
indeed be scarce but the scarcity has little price impact and thus little welfare impact. Disclosure
regulation is benecial not for assets with the most or least uncertain payos, but for the ones in
between. A similar argument reveals that disclosure is also most benecial when analyst report
precision is not very high or very low.
One potential objection to our results is that they come from preferences with constant absolute
risk aversion (CARA). CARA preferences are useful because they are simple and the CARA-
normal setting provides a familiar benchmark with which to compare our results. But they also
have the well-known shortcoming that investors' decisions are not aected by wealth. To ensure
that wealth eects do not overturn our results, section 4 examines a variant of the model where
dierent investors have dierent absolute risk aversion coecients.2 We nd that indeed their
decisions are dierent, with less risk averse (presumably wealthier) investors taking larger positions
and being more willing to pay for information. However, the welfare consequences of mandatory
disclosure regulations are unchanged: all investors prefer to have no information and only benet
from mandatory disclosure if it prevents informational asymmetry.
Another potential objection to our results and an often-cited reason to regulate nancial infor-
mation provision is that better information in nancial markets facilitates ecient real investments.
Therefore, section 5 incorporates a positive spillover from nancial information to the real economy
in the following way: At time 1, an issuer can choose how much real capital to invest in his rm. His
payo depends on the price the asset sells for in the time-2 nancial market. If nancial asset prices
2It would also be useful to relax the assumption that payos are normal. But with a general payo distribution,
the value of information cannot be expressed explicitly as a function of exogenous variables. In fact, Breon-Drish
(2012) proves that equilibrium asset prices may not even exist. He derives properties of welfare. But computing
welfare is not analytically tractable.
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are very sensitive to changes in the value of the capital stock (they are informationally ecient),
then the issuer is incentivized to invest the optimal amount.
Our results show that requiring more information disclosure improves the eciency of capital
allocation and maximizes output. But, surprisingly, considering the positive spillovers from nancial
information to the real economy does not overturn our result that more precise information hurts
investor welfare. The reason is that all the eciency gains accrue to the issuer. Investor returns are
compensation for bearing risk. A project that is known by all to be more valuable will command
a higher price. In equilibrium, it will have the same return as an equally risky, but lower-payo
project. If improving eciency does not aect the risk of the project, then promoting ecient real
investment may be a laudable goal, but it does not interact in any way with investor protection.
Ultimately, the desirability of mandatory disclosure depends on parameter values, which makes
the optimal policy a quantitative question. Of course, quantifying a model based on sale of infor-
mation is not an easy task. But one context where information is quantiable is credit ratings.
Section 6 uses data on ratings, prices, and performance of corporate bonds issued between 2004
and 2005 to estimate the model parameters and uses those estimates to compare the costs and
benets of ratings. The resulting numerical predictions tell us that rating costs are low, compared
to the benet of information, for the typical security. The costs are suciently low that without the
ratings mandate, issuers would cease to buy ratings and all investors would buy analyst reports for
themselves. Thus, requiring disclosure has no eect on the amount of information available about
the average security. It would simply replace analyst markets with issuer disclosures. Shifting
information costs from investors to issuers benets investors, but does not improve eciency. It is
a pure transfer.
Markets for information, and the question of whether to mandate information provision, matter
beyond just the nance industry. For instance, buying consumer goods or services with uncertain
benets is similar to investing in a risky asset. While nancial information helps to allocate real
productive capital, consumer goods information encourages high-value goods to be supplied and
low-value goods to be withdrawn. In both cases, mandatory information improves allocative ef-
ciency. But this eciency gain may not benet consumers because, in equilibrium, the price of
goods with less-uncertain quality is higher. One contribution of this paper is to assess regulation
of nancial market disclosure laws. But a second contribution is a framework that can be used to
think through and to quantify these competing equilibrium eects in a broad array of markets.
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Related literature Our paper is closely related to a recent literature on the welfare consequences
of information disclosure. In Amador and Weill (2012, 2010) and Kondor (2011), providing nancial
information can be welfare-reducing. But they do not model an information market and do not
consider the same equilibrium eects as we do. Similarly, Gozalo Llosa and Venkateswaran (2012)
consider the eciency of information acquisition decisions in a coordination game, but not in an
equilibrium asset market. Gorton and Ordonez (2012) allow investors to acquire information that
helps them distinguish rms with good collateral from those without. This type of information is
specic to collateralized lending and is distinct from the information about asset payos that we
consider.
Our work also contributes to the literature that connects the real and nancial sides of the
economy. Most of these linkages work through the supply of credit to individuals or rms. In
contrast, our model captures the idea that asset markets govern incentives: Market prices that
aggregate more investor information provide better incentives for rms to invest in a more ecient
manner. Like our model, Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan (2011), Ozdenoren and Yuan (2008)
Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski (2009) and Angeletos, Lorenzoni, and Pavan (2010) all propose
mechanisms that capture an information externality. The information spillover is that asset prices
aggregate information that rm managers can use to guide their real investment decisions. When
nancial investors can aect real investment, this creates complementarities in demand among
investors and the potential for multiple equilibria. This eect is not possible in our model beause
real investment takes place rst. More importantly, the type of information spillover our model
describes is distinct. An important part of our contribution is a simple, tractable way to capture the
idea that improving investors' access to information incentivizes rms to allocate capital eciently.
Our analysis also builds on work on costly information acquisition, such as Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980), Verrecchia (1982), Peress (2010), and Fishman and Parker (2011). But it extends
this work by considering the trade-os between issuer- and investor-purchased information and
connecting the asset market to the real economy. If the issuer does not provide the signal, investors
themselves can choose to purchase the information from an information market. We model the
market for information in a richer way than most of the previous literature by considering the non-
rival nature of information and solving for its endogenous market price (as in Wiederholt (2011)).
This allows us to consider whether, in the absence of disclosure regulation, either issuer-provided
or investor-purchased information markets will ll in the void. Furthermore, the model connects
nancial information choices to real investment choices, output and welfare.
Finally, this work is also related to a microeconomics literature on welfare and information
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disclosure (e.g. Shavell (1994), Diamond (1985) and Jovanovic (1982)). Our model diers because
it features a continuum of investors in a market that has an equilibrium price. Our results come
primarily from equilibrium eects. Hirshleifer (1971) also argues that information acquisition is
welfare-reducing because investors pay for it and it does not create any social value. Our results
go beyond Hirshleifer's eect by showing that investor welfare falls even when the investors do not
pay for the information, even when it does not distort risk-sharing, and even in an economy where
informed trade in asset markets results in a more output.
1 Model
Asset issuer A risk-neutral issuer sells a risky asset whose whose payo is y  N(y; 1hy ). Before
knowing y, the issuer must decide whether to produce a report about the asset's quality. The
report is a number  which is a noisy, unbiased signal about the risky asset's payo:  = y + ,
where   N(0; 1h ). Producing this report has a cost . Denote the sale price of the asset by p,
the decision to produce a report by D = 1 and the decision not to do so by D = 0. The issuer's
objective function is:
E(pjD)  D (1)
A policy of mandated disclosure consists of mandating that the issuer choose D = 1.
Investors and nancial markets There is a continuum of ex-ante identical investors with
measure Q. They have CARA expected utility3 with coecient of risk aversion :
EU = E
 e W  ; (2)
where W is their realized wealth. They have an initial endowment of wealth w0. Investors can
purchase fractional shares of the risky asset. They can also store their initial endowment with zero
net return. If the issuer has not provided a report on the asset quality, it may instead be possible
for individual investors to purchase an equivalent report from an independent analyst at a price c.
Each investor i individually chooses whether to purchase such a report (di = 1) or not (di = 0).
3Since the model has a single asset, any risk is systematic and will be priced as such. More generally, since asset
returns are correlated, the return analysts report on has a systematic component, which justies modeling investors
in any given asset as risk-averse.
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The investor's realized wealth is therefore
W = w0 + qi(y   p)  dic: (3)
where qi is the share of the project the investor buys.
The price p is determined in an auction. Each investor submits a bidding function bi(q) that
species the maximum amount that he is willing to pay for a fraction q of the risky asset as a
function of his information. These bid functions determine the aggregate demand. The auctioneer
species a market-clearing price p that equates aggregate demand and supply, and each trader pays
this price for each unit purchased (a Walrasian auction).4
Asset supply noise There is a set of agents who are subject to random shocks that force them to
buy or sell the asset, at any current price. The demand of this group of agents is normally distributed
with mean zero:   N(0; 1hx ). Let x denote the net supply of the asset, after accounting for the
noise trader demand: x  1   . Thus, x  N(1; 1hx ). This noise ensures that the price investors
condition on is not perfectly informative about information that others may know.
Information markets If the issuer does not produce information about the asset, the same
signal  can be discovered by independent analyst, at the same cost .5 Once this xed cost is
incurred, the information can be distributed at zero marginal cost. Analysts sell their services
to individual investors at a price c. For now, we assume that the information is protected by
intellectual property law and reselling it is forbidden. We revisit this assumption in the concluding
remarks.
The analyst market is perfectly contestable, so that analysts earn zero prots.6 This implies
that, if a measure  of investors chooses to purchase the analyst report, the price of the report
must be c =  .
The fact that information markets are competitive is crucial. The exact market structure is
not. Veldkamp (2006) analyzes a Cournot and a monopolistic competition market as well. All three
4As shown by Reny and Perry (2006), this formulation of the nancial market is equivalent to proposing aWalrasian
rational-expectations equilibrium. In particular, this is equivalent to assuming that investors take the market-clearing
price as given and the price is part of their information set.
5One might think that the cost would be higher for the independent analyst, especially if the issuer does not
cooperate, but as we will see below the issuer has every incentive to make the collection of information as easy as
possible.
6One way to ensure that the market is contestable is to force agents to choose prices in a rst stage and choose
entry in a second stage.
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markets produce information prices that decrease in demand.
Order of Events
1. The issuer decides whether or not he will pay to disclose information. (He does not know y,
 or  yet.)
2. (a) If the issuer discloses, all investors observe .
(b) If the issuer does not disclose, the analyst decides whether to nd out  and sets the
price c. Investors then simultaneously decide whether or not to buy the analyst's report.
Those who do observe .
3. Investors submit menus of prices and quantities of assets they are willing to purchase at each
price bi(q).
4. Asset auction takes place. The auctioneer sets a market-clearing price.
5. y is realized and all payos are received.
Equilibrium An equilibrium is a disclosure decisionD by the issuer, a demand di by each investor
for analyst reports, a decision by the analyst about whether to produce a report and a price c for the
report, bidding functions bi(q) for each possible information set and an asset price p(;D; fdig; )
such that: issuers choose disclosure D to maximize (1); investors choose di and bidding functions to
maximize (2) subject to (3); analysts make zero prots, and the asset market clears:
R Q
0 qidi = x.
2 Equilibrium and Welfare
We start by analyzing the properties of the second-period nancial market equilibrium, for given
information choices. Once we know what are the welfare consequences of investors having each
information structure, we can then investigate (in the following section) how information markets
aect these welfare predictions.
2.1 Equilibrium asset prices and information demand
Equilibrium prices With CARA utility and Normal asset payos, investor i's rst order condi-
tion for portfolio choice is:
qi =
Ei(y)  p
V ari(y)
(4)
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The bidding function is just the inverse of (4), i.e. bi(q) = Ei(y)   qV ari(y). The subscript i
denotes the fact that the calculation is made under investor i's information set. For investors who
have observed the report , Bayes' law says that
E(y) =
yhy + h
hy + h
(5)
V ar(y) =
1
hy + h
: (6)
For investors who have not observed the analyst report, the market-clearing auction price of
the risky asset partially reveals the analyst report that others (if any) have observed. Since the
price depends on asset demand and demand depends on information in the price, there is a xed
point problem. We solve by guessing a linear price rule
p = +  + (   y); (7)
and solving for the coecients ,  and . The following price coecients are derived in appendix
A.1:
 = y   
(hy + h) + (Q  )(hy + hp) (8)
 =

h
h + (Q  )hp
 (hy + h) + (Q  ) (hy + hp) (9)
 =
h + (Q  )hp
(hy + h) + (Q  )(hy + hp) (10)
where hp is the informativeness of the price and satises
hp =
2h2hx
2hhx + 2
: (11)
and  is the measure of investors who observe the signal .
The average price is , and it consists of the ex-ante expected payo y less a term that accounts
for investors' risk aversion  and the amount of information they have, which depends on the
precision of the information, the informativeness of prices and how many investors buy the report.
The sensitivity of the price to information (the report or disclosure) is given by .  takes values
between 0 and 1, and is greater when information is very precise relative to the prior and a large
fraction of investors buy them. The sensitivity of the price to noise in demand is given by . Prices
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will tend to be relatively sensitive to demand noise when investors are risk averse, when few have
bought the analysts' report or when the report is not very informative.
For the case where the issuer discloses the information (either by choice or due to the mandate),
formulas (8) - (11) still apply, setting  = Q. For the case where no one buys the analyst report,
the formulas apply taking the limit as ! 0.
Information choice when the issuer does not disclose In case the issuer does not provide
the report, investors will simultaneously choose whether to buy it from the analyst. Since they are
ex-ante identical, they will only make dierent choices when those choices yield identical expected
utility. Appendix A.2 shows that the equilibrium measure of informed investors is
 =
p
hxh
s
h
(hy + h)(1  exp( 2c))   1 (12)
By equation (11), higher values of  make prices more informative, which diminishes the value
of the signal, and vice versa, which means there is at most one value of  that makes investors
indierent. If equation (12) produces a number that is not between 0 and Q, then there is a corner
solution. If the right hand side of (12) is an imaginary number, this means that utility is always
higher for uninformed investors and therefore the corner solution is  = 0. If the right hand side
of (12) is greater than Q, then the corner solution is  = Q and all investors become informed.
Equation (12) implies that demand for the analyst report is decreasing in the price c, decreasing
in the precision of the prior hy and increasing in the variability of noise trader demand
1
hx
, which
makes prices less informative. The eect of analyst report precision h is ambiguous. On the one
hand, more precise information is more valuable; on the other, it induces informed traders to take
larger positions in the asset, which makes equilibrium prices more informative as well.
Equilibrium implies that, if the issuer does not disclose, either the analyst does not produce the
signal or (12) and the zero-prot condition holds:
c =


: (13)
Voluntary disclosure by the issuer In those cases where, absent regulation, the issuer would
voluntarily provide a report then disclosure mandates would be irrelevant. The issuer will volun-
tarily choose D = 1 only when the increase in expected prices from doing so outweighs the cost
. Let p1 be the price of an asset when the issuer chooses D = 1 and p0 be the price of the asset
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if D = 0 and information provision is determined by whatever is the outcome in the market for
analyst reports. Then, the issuer will disclose when E[p1]   > E[p0].
Proposition 1 (Disclosure by issuer)
1. If

Q
h
hy (h + hy)
> ; (14)
then either the issuer will disclose, or at least some investors will buy a report
2. If condition (14) does not hold, the issuer will not disclose.
When the issuer considers whether or not to disclose, he takes into account the equilibrium
measure of investors that will buy the analyst report if he doesn't provide it (). In case disclosing
results in more information (which will be the case unless  = Q), equation (8) implies that this
raises his expected revenue from selling the asset. The reason is that, by providing investors with
information, the issuer reduces the risk they have to bear, which increases average prices. Of
course, it is always possible that the disclosure results in bad news that reduces the asset's price.
But on average, the news is neither good nor bad. It's average eect is simply its eect of reducing
uncertainty. The issuer trades o this expected gain against the cost  of disclosure.
Condition (14) says that the gains from providing information outweigh the cost, assuming that
if the issuer does not disclose, the investors will not buy analyst reports. If the condition holds,
then either the issuer expects a sucient number of investors to buy information on their own,
or he will disclose. If the condition doesn't hold, then the issuer prefers not to disclose in any
circumstance, even if he expects all investors to remain uninformed.
Proposition 1 implies that issuers will certainly not disclose (and therefore mandatory disclosure
regulation will matter) if: (1) the precision h is too low; or (2) the cost  is too high; or (3) investors
are suciently risk tolerant (low ) or numerous (high Q) that the discount from bearing risk is
small; or (4) the precision of investors' prior is high enough that the additional information from
the disclosure makes little dierence
2.2 Welfare
Maximizing a weighted sum of utilities is the most commonly used social welfare criterion. In this
setting, the objective this produces depends on how one weights the issuer (a single entity) versus
the investors (a continuum of agents). The question of how one models the noise traders then also
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comes into play. Since we have no guidance on how to weight these various constituencies, we
simply examine their utilities separately. In each case, we ask how they would be aected by a
policy that mandated D = 1.
Issuer A simple revealed preference argument establishes that the asset issuer is always weakly
better o without the disclosure mandate. Without the mandate, the asset issuer can always choose
D = 1, with identical eects as if he were forced to do so. But with the mandate, he cannot choose
D = 0, which could be the preferred option for some parameter values.
Investors We start by comparing a hypothetical market where investors have no access to any
information (in the notation above,  = 0) to one where there is mandatory disclosure.
Proposition 2 (Investors prefer information market collapse) Investors have higher ex-
ante expected utility when no information is provided than when disclosure is mandatory.
Investors benet from access to a high-risk, high-return asset. They are indierent between
holding the last, marginal share of a risky asset, but earn a utility benet from holding all the
inframarginal shares. When rms disclose, it is as if the asset is replaced by a lower-risk, lower
return asset. Investors earn less of a utility benet from holding this asset at the new, higher
equilibrium price.
To see why investors prefer high return and high risk, note that in the CARA-Normal framework,
conditional expected utility satises
Ei[U ] /   exp
 1
2
(Ei(y)  p)2
V ari(y)

: (15)
(See Appendix A.2 for derivation.) Roughly speaking, expected returns enter quadratically in
investors' utility because the direct eect is compounded by them taking larger positions. The
fact that variance enters (linearly) in the denominator of the fraction tells us that each investor
individually would prefer more information. But when all investors acquire more information, the
expected return falls. Using equation (8) for the special cases of  = 0 or  = Q, the unconditional
expected return per unit of the asset is proportional to the conditional variance: E[y] p = V ari(y).
Overall, the eect of higher variance on utility through higher expected returns dominates the direct
risk eect and expected utility is increasing in the conditional variance of the asset payo. Acquiring
information is like a prisoner's dilemma. Each investor wants to observe more information. But
investors would like to collectively commit to observe less.
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Proposition 2 implies that if the choice were between mandating and prohibiting disclosure (or
the distribution of any analysis), investors would collectively benet from a prohibition. However,
this does not immediately imply that disclosure mandates make them worse o. Investors may
prefer mandatory disclosure when the alternative is asymmetric information. If issuers will not
disclose and only some investors are willing to buy the analyst report at the equilibrium information
price, then there will be asymmetric information, with some investors knowing  and others not.
The informed and uninformed investors will hold dierent quantities of risky and riskless assets. But
since all investors are identical ex-ante, holding dierent portfolios entails sharing risk ineciently.
Inecient risk sharing reduces investor welfare. If this welfare eect is strong enough, investors
prefer that a mandatory disclosure statute restore information symmetry.
Proposition 3 (Investors prefer mandatory disclosure to asymmetric information) If
in equilibrium D = 0 and  is suciently high, then investors have higher expected utility when
disclosure is mandatory.
If the equilibrium is such that most investors will choose to buy the signal from the independent
analyst, any given investor faces a choice between being less informed than most other traders or
paying for the information. In the limit, if everyone else is informed ( = Q), an investor who pays
for the information will have the same utility as in the mandatory disclosure case minus the cost of
the report. In an equilibrium with  close to Q, each investor will be indierent between bearing
the cost of information or suering from asymmetric information and would prefer mandatory
disclosure, which shifts the cost of the report onto the issuer.
Noise traders Finally, there is the issue of how (whether) to include noise traders in the welfare
calculation. One possible interpretation of noise traders is that they are merely a modeling conve-
nience to capture the idea of imperfection in the information aggregation process and thus one can
safely ignore them in the welfare calculation. Another is to assume that noise traders are either
trading for liquidity reasons or are making mistakes. Their welfare is still aected by the prots or
losses they make from trading in this market. The aggregate prots they make are given by
 = (y   p)
and, using (7), expected prots are given by
E =   
hx
(16)
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where , given by equation (9), is the sensitivity of the asset price to noise trader demand. Noise
traders are hurt by the fact that when they trade they move the price against themselves.
Proposition 4 (Noise traders benet from mandates) The prots of noise traders are max-
imized when disclosure is mandatory.
When all investors are informed, the asset is less risky for them, which makes their demand more
elastic and thus more able to absorb noise with little change in price. Furthermore, the fact that
investors are informed means they don't infer anything from prices, so noise traders do not adversely
aect investors' estimates of the value of the asset. For this reason, noise traders are always better
o when  = Q, which the mandate brings about.
3 For Which Assets Might Regulation Be Benecial to Investors?
The results above show that mandatory disclosure regulation can be benecial for investors when,
absent a mandate, they would be faced with a choice between paying for information or being
asymmetrically less informed than other traders. This section analyzes under what conditions this
situation is likely to arise.
Cost of producing information
Proposition 5 (Investors prefer mandatory disclosure when information is cheap.)
There exists a cuto  such that for  < , investor welfare is higher with mandatory disclosure.
One might think that it is when information is very expensive that investors would prefer for
asset issuers to pay for it and provide it to them for free. Instead, when information is expensive,
investors know that few among them will buy analyst reports, so there will be few informed investors
to drive up asset prices and excess returns will be available. Instead, when information is cheap,
most investors will buy it. Anticipating this, the issuer will choose not to provide the report. In
this scenario, investors would prefer that disclosure be provided for free.
Precision of information
Proposition 6 (Investors do not buy low-precision reports) If
h
hy
< exp

2
Q

  1 (17)
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investors will not buy an analyst report
Proposition 6 implies that an investor-based information market will not exist if: (1) the in-
formation content of the analyst report h is small relative to the precision of the prior hy, since
this makes information less valuable; or (2) either the xed cost of information discovery  is high
or the investor base Q is small (which makes the price c that the analyst needs to charge high, or
(3) investors are very risk averse, which makes them take small positions in the asset and therefore
prot little from better information.
Proposition 7 (Investors do not buy high-precision reports) Investors will not buy an an-
alyst report if h is suciently high.
Proposition 7 reveals a subtlety about the market for analyst reports. If the reports contain
very precise information, informed investors will take large positions, which makes prices highly
informative. With a xed price c for the analyst report, this would imply that as precision increases,
only a vanishing measure of investors choose to become informed, as is the case in the model of
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). However, because the analyst must cover the xed cost , low
demand means it must raise prices. For suciently high precision, there is simply no price at which
this market is viable.
Propositions 6 and 7 jointly imply that an investor-led market for analyst reports can only
function if the information is of some intermediate level of precision. Therefore it is only for these
intermediate levels of precision where the asymmetric information situation might arise. In either
precision extreme, the independent analyst market is not viable so investors do not have to worry
about being less informed than others.
4 Heterogeneous Investors and Wealth Eects
One of the shortcoming of working with the CARA specication for preferences is that it assumes
away wealth eects in investment decisions and, by extension, in information choice decisions. A
simple way to allow for wealth eects while keeping the simplicity of the CARA-Normal framework
is to allow for dierent investors to have dierent (constant) absolute risk aversion coecients.
One could in principle then link back the level of absolute risk aversion to each investor's wealth
by postulating a relationship between wealth and absolute risk aversion. Makarov and Schornick
(2010) follow this approach. This extension makes it possible to ask whether dierent disclosure
regulations might have dierent impact on investors of dierent wealth levels.
15
Formally, assume that there is a function i that species the absolute risk aversion coecient
of investor i and assume without loss of generality that this function is increasing. The issuer
and investors play the same game as in section 1. Equating supply and demand reveals that the
equilibrium price will be linear, as in (7), with coecients
 = y   1
(hy + h) L + (hy + hp) H
 =
1
 Lh
 Lh +  Hhp
(hy + h) L + (hy + hp) H
 =
 Lh +  Hhp
(hy + h) L + (hy + hp) H
;
where  L 
R i
0 1=i di is the average risk tolerance of informed agents,  H 
R Q
i 1=i di is the
average risk tolerance of uninformed agents, and i is the investor who is indierent between
buying and not buying the signal, who satises the indierence condition
i =
1
2c
log

hy + h
hy + hp

:
Finally, the equilibrium asset price is a signal about rm value, with precision
hp =
 2Lh
2
hx
 2Lhhx + 1
:
Investors with lower absolute risk aversion (implicitly, wealthier investors) take larger positions
in the risk asset and therefore have a higher willingness to pay for a given piece of information. In
equilibrium, there is a cuto investor i such that investors with lower risk aversion than i buy
the analyst report and those with higher risk aversion choose to remain uninformed. In principle,
this could mean that some investors benet from mandatory disclosure rules while other are hurt
by them. Nevertheless, the results below show that the main welfare results for the homogeneous-
investor case carry over to this more general case.
Proposition 8 (Investor welfare with heterogeneity)
1. All investors have higher expected utility with no information than with mandatory disclosure.
2. If in equilibrium D = 0 and i is suciently high, all investors have higher expected utility
with mandatory disclosure.
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3. There exists a cuto  such that all investors have higher expected utility with mandatory
disclosure if  < .
Part 1 of Proposition 8 generalizes Proposition 2 for the case with heterogeneous risk aversion;
part 2 generalizes Proposition 3 and part 3 generalizes Proposition 5.
Together, these results show that none of the main welfare results are depend on the assumption
of homogeneous investors and/or the absence of wealth eects. All investors, irrespective of their
risk aversion, benet when the lack of information gives them access to a higher risk, higher return
asset. Also, all investors benet from mandatory disclosure when it is the only way to avoid a
choice between paying a cost or being at an informational disadvantage. This case is still likely to
arise when the cost of producing information is relatively small.
5 Financial Information and Real Economic Eciency
By studying the asset market in isolation, we have seen why investors prefer no information, to full
information, to severe asymmetric information. Considering the interaction between investor and
issuer information choice and the prices in information markets delivered insights into which assets
were likely to generate asymmetric information. But one would suspect that these results could
change dramatically if we allowed for nancial information to have spillovers into the real economy.
To see how real economic spillovers change the results, we build on the previous model by adding
an initial period where an issuer builds up his rm, prior to its IPO.
The real investment model Suppose that instead of having an exogenous payo y, the dividend
from the asset depends on the issuer's investment according to
y = f(k) + u (18)
where k  0 is real capital investment and f is a concave function with f 0(0) > 1 and u  N(0; 1hy ).
The issuer chooses D rst, and then k to maximize:
E (pjk;D)  k   CD (19)
The choice of k is not observable by investors. The game progresses as follows. First, the issuer
chooses D and k. Then the game progresses as in section 1. Finally, y is realized and payos
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are received. Since the decision D is observable but k is not, it is necessary to specify both what
investment k(D) the issuer would choose for each disclosure decision D (including o-equilibrium)
and what are investors' beliefs about k depending on D, which we denote by k(D). Note that
the issuer chooses his disclosure rst, so that there is no signalling value to the choice of D and no
strategic disclosure. The realistic counterpart to this assumption is that rms have long-standing
disclosure policies. They disclose at regular intervals and rarely change that policy, even if they
would prefer not to disclose bad news. This leads to the following equilibrium denition.
Equilibrium An equilibrium consists of a disclosure decision D and then an investment decision
k(D) by the issuer; a demand di by each investor for analyst reports, a decision by the analyst
about whether to produce a report and a price c for the report, bidding functions bi(q) for each
possible information set and an asset price p(;D; fdig; ) such that: issuers choose disclosure D
to maximize (19) and, taking D as given, choose k(D) to maxmize (19); investors choose di and
bidding functions to maximize (2) subject to (3); analysts make zero prots; the asset market
clears:
R Q
0 qidi = x, and investors' belief about investment is correct: k
(D) = k(D).
5.1 Real investment decision
Replacing the equilibrium price into the issuer's objective function in (19) and noting that  =
f(k) + u+ , the issuer solves
max
k
E [+  +  (f(k) + u+    f(k(D)))]  k
Note that, because investment is unobserved, the issuer cannot aect beliefs about k(D)
through the investment decision. The reason for the issuer to undertake investment is to aect
the analyst report and therefore to indirectly aect the selling price.
The rst order condition for investment is
f 0(k) =
1

The value of  depends on whether the issuer has disclosed and, if he has not, on how many
investors have purchased analyst reports. Since by equation (10),  < 1, investment always falls
below its rst-best level, which is dened by f 0(k) = 1. Furthermore, since  is increasing in ,
investment will be higher when more investors are informed. Therefore whenever the equilibrium
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value of  in an investor-driven market is less than Q, investment will be higher under disclosure.
Note further that if no information is provided for investors, then  = 0 and therefore k = 0.7
Information is socially valuable in this model because when investors are informed, they bid
more for rms that have invested more. Since the owners of the high-investment rms gain more
from selling higher-priced shares, this gives issuers an incentive to invest. The ineciency here
comes from the fact that investment is unobserved. Providing investors with noisy signals about
the rm's value helps to remedy this friction. Thus it promotes a level of investment that is closer
to the ecient level.
5.2 Welfare in a production economy
Eect on output One possible objective a government might have is to simply maximize the
production of real goods. This is obviously a simplication, but it makes for a good starting point.
The relevant question becomes: Which disclosure policies maximize output f(k)?
The primary friction in the model is that investors' imperfect information about capital invest-
ment decisions of the rm reduces the issuer's return to investing in capital. In other words, if
investors don't know that the issuer invested more, he won't be compensated for that investment
when he sells his rm. Eciency requires that the marginal return to investment be equal to its
unit marginal cost: f 0(k) = 1. Therefore if we somehow manage to ensure that the private return to
a marginal unit of investment is equal to its social return, @E(pjk)k = f
0(k), then investment will be
ecient. With imperfect information, the left side is typically smaller than the right because prices
can only respond to changes in k to the extent that investors know k. The following analysis shows
that mandatory information provision to nancial markets helps to remedy this friction because it
makes p more responsive to k.
Since the production function is concave, a higher f(k) corresponds to a lower marginal product
of capital f 0(k). The issuer's rst-order condition tells him to set f 0(k) = 1=. The pricing
coecient  (equation 10) is increasing in the measure of informed investors  because h  hp, i.e
prices cannot reveal more information that what is contained in the signals they are revealing.
If disclosure is mandated by the government,  = Q, this maximizes , minimizes f 0(k) and
thus maximizes f(k) over all feasible values ( 2 [0; Q]). Thus, mandating disclosure provides the
maximum possible information, which maximizes output of real economic goods. Since information
7The result that k = 0 without disclosure is obviously unrealistic. To remedying this problem simply requires
adding a free public signal about y. Section 6 works out a model with a free public signal. It does not undermine
our eect.
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facilitates the ecient allocation of capital, mandatory information disclosure maximizes gross
output.
Eect on output net of costs One obvious objection to the analysis in the previous subsection
is that it does not take into account the cost of information production. Another possible objective
is to maximize f(k)   k   , where  = 1 if any agent (issuer or investor) discovers information
and  = 0 otherwise.
If equilibrium is such that D = 0 but  2 (0; Q], then it is immediate that mandatory disclosure
maximizes net output, since the cost will be paid regardless and  = Q will bring investment closest
to ecient levels. If equilibrium is such thatD = 1, then mandatory disclosure is irrelevant. Finally,
if equilibrium is such that the information is not produced at all, then in equilibrium k = 0 and
mandatory disclosure maximizes net output whenever f(k(1))  k(1)  > f(0). Substituting in
k from the rst-order condition in this inequality yields
f

(f 0) 1

1 +
hy
h

  (f 0) 1

1 +
hy
h

  : > f(0)
We know that f 0(k(1)) > 1, so that anything that increases k(1) also increases f 0(k(1))  k(1)
and therefore makes the inequality more likely to hold. A higher ratio of the signal precision to
prior precision (h=hy) makes k
(1) higher, making it more likely that the high-information level
of capital is the one that maximizes output net of investment and information costs.
Investor welfare Next, we show that the same two investor welfare results from the model
without production still hold in the model with production.
Proposition 9 (Investor welfare in the economy with production) Propositions 2-7 hold in
the production economy.
What the production economy changes is that now disclosure raises the expected value of the
asset. But recall that investors benet from access to a high-risk, high-return asset. They do not
benet from high-expected-value assets because these assets have a high price to compensate for
their high value. Return is oered for bearing risk, not for buying valuable assets. This can be
seen from equation (8), which shows that increases in y translate one-for-one into increases in the
price, and therefore have no eect on expected returns or on investor welfare. In other words, any
eciency gains from improved incentives to invest are captured 100% by the issuer of the asset.
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Therefore all the results regarding how mandatory disclosure aects investor welfare carry through
directly.
Of course, this is a stylized model. One could certainly build a model where the presence of
the production economy aected investor welfare. But the key to building such a model would be
that the production economy must change the risk investors bear. Expected increases in eciency
result in more valuable assets, and higher prices for those assets. When the payo and the price
increases together, the return on the asset doesn't change. In an equilibrium model with a constant
price of risk, anything that doesn't change risk doesn't change returns.
5.3 Issuer disclosure decision
The addition of a production economy does not change how investors rank information structures,
but it does change which information structure is likely to prevail. Specically, it makes it more
advantageous for the issuer to disclose information, which makes asymmetric information problems
less likely. Therefore, it shrinks the set of parameters for which mandatory disclosure benets
investors.
As before, the issuer will disclose i expected payos net of the information cost  exceed
expected payos without information. Now, with production, he takes into account that his decision
to disclose will aect his decision of how much to invest and will aect the price the asset sells for
in the nancial market. Let p1 be the price of an asset when investment k
(1) is undertaken and
all investors observe the analysts' report. Let p0 be the price of the asset when investment k
(0) is
undertaken and there is an active market for analyst reports. Then, the issuer will disclose when
E[p1]  k(1)   > E[p0]  k(0).
Proposition 10 (Disclosure by issuer with production)
1. If
f(k(1))  k(1)  f(0) + 
Q
h
hy (h + hy)
> ; (20)
then either the issuer will disclose, or at least some investors will buy a report
2. If condition (20) does not hold, the issuer will not disclose.
As before, by providing investors with information, the issuer reduces the risk they have to
bear, which increases average prices. The new source of gain is that better information will result
in closer-to-ecient investment. Compared to (14), condition (20) introduces the additional term
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f(k(1)) k(1) f(0) which reects the eciency gains from disclosure. Hence the set of parameters
for which the issuer will choose D = 1, preventing asymmetric information and making mandatory
disclosure irrelevant, is larger than in the economy with no production. Although policy makers
cite eciency gains as a rationale for mandatory disclosure laws, ironically, adding real eciency
gains weakens the case for disclosure as an investor protection measure.
6 A Quantitative Evaluation
The theory can provide a set of parameter values for which investors prefer disclosure mandates and
set of parameters for which the investors prefer their repeal. So ultimately, the question of whether
disclosure enhances investor welfare or not is a quantitative one. This section examines a particular
type of information (credit ratings), proposes some rough estimates for the model parameters and
nds that the individual benet to an investor of acquiring information about an average bond
far outweighs the price of the information. Thus, even though investors are collectively worse o
when everyone acquires information, the individual incentive to become informed is so strong that
all investors choose to purchase information. Thus, it suggests that for average assets, mandating
disclosure simply substitutes rm disclosures for information that investors would otherwise acquire
on their own.
Focusing on credit ratings has advantages and disadvantages. The advantage is that there is
a clear sense of what the information in credit ratings is and there exist measures of how much
it costs to produce. Furthermore, current regulation on credit ratings is somewhat akin to a
mandatory disclosure system, in that many types of investors can only invest in rated assets and
therefore issuers must obtain a rating and bear the cost if they wish to sell their securities to these
investors. On the other hand, credit ratings are about debt-like instruments, so the normality-of-
payo assumptions that we make in the model are not a great t.
Data description We select parameters to match features of corporate bonds. Our data comes
from Datastream and includes all corporate bonds issued in 2004 and 2005, with maturities of not
more than 30 years, whose prices are tracked by Datastream. In total, this amounts to 770 dierent
bonds. The bond ratings are the Standard and Poor's rating, prior to issuance.
For each bond, we know the price at the time when it was issued and the rating at the time of
issue. It is this initial rating that we compare to the model rating . We also know the promised
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annual coupon (interest) payments on the bond, its face value and its market price 1 year later.8
In our sample, the average coupon rate (annual interest promised) is 5.7%.
To make the data comparable to the objects in the model, we make two transformations. First,
we adjust prices for uctuations in the risk-free rate. The problem is that if a bond is issued in
2004, and then in 2005 the risk-free interest rises, the 2005 price of the bond will fall for reasons
that are outside our model. Second, the contractual terms (e.g. the coupon rate) dier across
bonds. To adjust for this, we construct a variable yp that is the present value of all the promised
payments { coupons plus face value at redemption. Then, we normalize the issue price ~p and the
bond payo ~y by yp so that p = ~p=yp and y = ~y=yp. These normalized prices and payos are what
we compare to p and y in the model. The details of these transformations are laid out in Appendix
B.
Parameter selection In order to estimate parameters we assume that the data has been gener-
ated by the model under the current regime of issuer-provided ratings, which implies  = Q. We set
the values of the ve key model parameters to match ve moments of the data whose dependence
on the parameters is fairly straightforward.
We do this in a slightly extended version of the model where, in addition to the rating, all
investors observe a public signal w = y +  where   N(0; h 1w ). Details of this extension are in
Appendix C. The extension makes no dierence for the theoretical results above since this public
signal enters the model in exactly the same way as the prior. However, this extension allows the
model to better t the data since the public signal, though unobserved to the econometrician,
is allowed to be dierent for each bond in the sample and gets incorporated into prices. This
allows the model to account for the fact that prices, even though they have noise, are slightly more
informative about bond payos than are ratings.
The appendix derives the following ve moments that are functions of the parameters: hy, hw,
h, hx and =Q:
1. The unconditional variance of bond payos. It pins down the parameter hy.
V ar (y) =
1
hy
(21)
8Ideally, one would follow each bond all they way up to maturity or default but data limitations prevented this.
Thus, our measure of the output from the asset is the value an investor would have realized by selling the bond one
year after issue, when at least some uncertainty has been realized. As a robustness check, we re-did the analysis using
the bond's market price 2 years later and found very little dierence in the result.
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2. Informativeness of the rating. This is the R2 of a regression of bond payos y on ratings .
Given that the rst moment pinned down hy, this one determines the noise in ratings h.
R2yj =
1
1 +
hy
h
(22)
Since ratings are discrete, when we estimate this R2, we use a dummy variable for each
possible rating.
3. Average returns. The average bond return is particularly sensitive to, and therefore particu-
larly informative about risk aversion and the measure of investors =Q.
E [y   p] = 
Q (hy + hw + h)
(23)
This measure of return is an absolute amount, not a percentage return, as typically computed
in the data. To convert this absolute return into an average percentage return, simply divide
by the average (nomalized) bond price, which is 0:914.
4. Informativeness of the price. This is the R2 of a regression of bond payos y on bond prices p.
It is sensitive to the amount of public information hw and how much noise the noise trading
introduces hx.
R2yjp =
1

(h+hw)Q
2 hy
hx
+ 1 +
hy
h+hw
(24)
If hw is very high, then this R
2 approaches 1. Instead if hw = 0, this R
2 = [


hQ
2 hy
hx
+ 1+
hy
h
] 1, which means the informativeness of prices is necessarily lower than the informativeness
of ratings. In the data, prices are slightly more informative than ratings, which means that w
must contain at least some information. In other words, investors know more than just \this
is a bond," even before they observe any bond ratings.
Similarly, if noise trader demand is very predictable (high hx) then prices reveal most of the
information in ratings and public signals. This makes the R2 high. If noise trading is very
volatile, then prices will reect more noise and less information. The eect of noise trading
also depends on risk aversion and signal precision. If investors have low risk aversion or very
precise information, then noise traders have less eect on prices.
5. Price variance. The unconditional variance of the bond price also reects how much noise
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Table 1: Parameter values for numerical results.
parameter value target

Q 12:4 average returns
hy 142 bond payo variance
hw 266 informativeness of prices
h 128 informativeness of ratings
hx 0:330 price variance
 0:00029 Treacy and Carey (2000)
trading causes the price to vary and how much public information moves price around.
V ar (p) =

1
hy + hw + h
2 " 
Q
2 1
hx
+
(h + hw)
2
hy
+ h + hw
#
(25)
Notice that  and Q always enter as a ratio, implying that they are not separately identied in the
model when  = Q.
The one other parameter we need to calibrate is the xed cost of information discovery. Treacy
and Carey (2000) report that the average cost of rating an asset is 0:0325% of the value of the
issue, so we set the  equal to 0:0325% times the average price of 0:91. Table 1 summarizes our
parameter estimates.
Note that ratings are about as informative as prior beliefs. But public information is more
informative than either. The variance of noise trader demand is quite high (low hx) to account for
the relatively high variance of prices conditional on ratings, which the model interprets as resulting
from noise.
Numerical results Given these parameters values, the optimal strategy for an asset issuer is not
to disclose. The reason is that the issuer knows that all investors will buy the rating anyway. Thus,
with or without mandatory disclosure, all investors are informed. A disclosure mandate simply
transfers the amount of the ratings fee c from investors to issuers. These ndings suggest that
recent wave of mandatory disclosure policies benet investors, at the expense of asset issuers. But
they also tell us that the reform is not likely to aect market information or liquidity.
To see why all investors would choose to purchase the rating, consider the indierence condition
for the marginal investor who decides whether or not to buy the rating. It tells us that the investor
will buy the rating as long as the utility benet (left-hand side) exceeds the utility cost (right hand
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side): s
V ar (yjp)
V ar (yj)   1 > exp (c)  1 (26)
Consider the case where all investors buy the rating and examine the incentive of the last innites-
imal investor to buy the rating as well. Given our estimated parameters, which imply hp = 27:58,
the conditional variances of payos ares
V ar (yjp)
V ar (yj) =
s
hy + hw + h
hy + hw + hp
=
r
536
435:58
= 1:109:
If all investors buy the signal, the ratings agencies charge each investor c = =Q. Thus, exp(c)
= exp(=Q) = exp(12:4  :00029) = 1:004. Subtracting one and comparing these terms, we nd
that the utility benet of the rating is 0:109, while the utility cost is 0:004. This means that, even
when the value of information is at its lowest, when all other investors also have the information,
the value of that information exceeds its cost by more than a factor of 25.
7 Conclusions
The paper investigated the welfare consequences of mandatory nancial disclosures. It character-
izes the types of assets for which a free market for information will provide reports to investors.
Information could be produced and disclosed by an issuer who wants to make his project less risky
and therefore more valuable to investors, so that it fetches a higher price at auction. Alternatively,
analyst reports could be purchased by investors who want to know how much of the risky asset to
buy.
When the private market provides information to most investors, mandatory disclosure will
have little eect on most assets' prices or on welfare. But in some instances, that private market
does not provide information. In these cases, issuers are always better o without the disclosure
mandate. Surprisingly, investors are often better o without the mandate as well. Investors' welfare
is maximized when no information about the asset payo is available to anyone.
There are some limitations to interpreting these welfare results. This model included only two
salent potential benets of nancial information: facilitating the allocation of productive capital and
preventing the inecient risk-sharing that comes with asymmetrically informed investors. These
benets must be weighed against the cost of information discovery and the loss of investors surplus
when an asset becomes less risky. But there are other possible benets of disclosure, such as
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the ability to limit risk-taking by banks or portfolio managers or the ability to assess the risk of
large pools of assets. There are also other possible problems with disclosures such as manipulation
of reports, the possibility that rm disclosures crowd out some richer more nuanced sources of
information, or outright fraud. None of these are incorporated in the model. Yet, the ability of
disclosures to ameliorate asymmetric information problems and to improve the eciency of asset
prices are certainly two of the most widely-acknowledged benets.
A maintained assumption in the model is that, unlike partial revelation through prices, direct
leakage of information, for instance by investors who bought the analyst report sharing it with
those who have not, can be eectively prevented by intellectual property laws. However, this might
be hard to enforce due to technologies that make it easy to disseminate information. If information
leakage cannot be prevented, analysts might not be able to sell enough copies of the information
at a high enough price to pay for the xed cost of information discovery. This would render the
investor-pay market inviable through a far more direct channel than the model examines.
The degree to which information leakage is an insurmountable concern is a matter of debate.
For the case of credit ratings, ratings agencies did mainly follow an investor-pay model until around
the mid-twentieth century, and historical accounts dier on the relative roles played by regulation
and technological progress (in particular, photocopying machines) in driving the shift towards an
issuer-pay market (White, 2010). For other types of information such as equity analysis, the issue
is even less clear. Analysts can try to take measures to prevent easy retransmission of information,
such as delivering their reports in non-recorded oral communications, but whether these attempts
are successful remains an open question.
If the threat of information leakage undermines the investor pay market, asset issuers would
still prefer no regulation because then they can choose to disclose or not. Investors' opposition to
a disclosure mandate would now be unambiguous: Unregulated information markets would never
result in asymmetric information. Therefore, if the mandate has any eect at all, it is to prevent
there being no information available. But investors prefer to have no information available because
more information reduces the expected return on the assets they buy.
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A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Financial market equilibrium
Beginning with the market clearing condition qI + (Q  ) qU = x we use the formulas for qI and qU and to solve
for p:
Qf(k(D))hy + [h   p(hy + h)] + (Q  )
h
f(k(D)) +
p  


hp   p(hy + hp)
i
= x
Qf(k(D))hy + (Q  )
h
f(k(D))  

i
hp + h   p
h
(hy + h) + (Q  )(hy + hp)  (Q  )hp

i
= x
p =
Qf(k(D))hy + (Q  )
h
f(k(D)))  

i
hp + h   x
(hy + h) + (Q  )(hy + hp)  (Q  )hp
(27)
which has a linear form as conjectured. Equating coecients:
 =
f(k(D))[(hy + h) + (Q  )(hy + hp)]  (Q  ) ahp   
(hy + h) + (Q  )(hy + hp)  (Q  )hp
(28)
 =

 (hy + h) + (Q  ) (hy + hp)  (Q  ) hp
 =
h
 (hy + h) + (Q  ) (hy + hp)  (Q  ) hp
Computing price informativeness yields
hp =
1
1
h
+



2
1
hx
: (29)
Substituting in expressions for  and  yields (11) and replacing hp in (28) yields (8)-(10).
A.2 Equilibrium measure of informed investors
Recall the utility function:
EU =  E [exp f Wg]
where
Wi = (w0   cd) + qi [y   p]
where c is the price of the rating and d = 1 if the investor bought it and zero otherwise.
Because of the CARA-Normal structure, expected utility conditional on an information set for investor i is
EUi =   exp
n
 
h
Ei (Wi)  
2
V ari (Wi)
io
(30)
Use that qi =
Ei(y) p
V ari(y)
so that
Wi = w0   cd+ Ei(y)  p
V ari(y)
[y   p]
and therefore
Ei (Wi) = (w0   cd) + [Ei (y)  p]
2
V ari (y)
(31)
and
V ari (Wi) =
[Ei (y)  p]2
2V ari (y)
(32)
Replacing (31) and (32) in (30):
EUi =   exp (  (w0   cd)) exp

 1
2
[Ei (y)  p]2
V ari (y)

(33)
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Denote an informed investore by the subscript I and an uninformed investor by the subscript U .
The information set of an informed investor includes  and p. Let
I  V ar [EI (y)  p] (34)
ZI  EI (y)  pp
I
(35)
Replacing (34) and (35) into (33):
EUI =   exp (  (w0   c)) exp

  I
2V arI (y)
Z2I

(36)
Conditional on p, ZI follows a Normal distribution with mean AI =
E(yjp) pp
I
and standard deviation 1. Using
that, by the law of total variance
V ar (yjp) = I + V arI (y)
and the MGF of a noncentral 2 distribution to take conditional expectations of (36), we conclude that
E [UI jp] =   exp (  (w0   c))
s
V arI (y)
V ar (yjp) exp

  (E (yjp)  p)
2
2V ar (yjp) :

(37)
For the uninformed investor, equation (33) directly implies
E [UU jp] =   exp ( w0) exp

  (E (yjp)  p)
2
2V ar (yjp)

(38)
To compare the the conditional expected utilities of informed and uninformed investors, use (37) and (38) and
note that V arI(y) = V ar(yj; p) = V ar(yj) to conclude that
E [VI jp]  E [VU jp] =
"
exp (c)
s
V ar (yj)
V ar (yjp)   1
#
E [VU jp]
Taking expectations over p, ex-ante indierence requires:
exp (c)
s
V ar (yj)
V ar (yjp) = 1 (39)
Using
V ar(yj) = 1
hy + h
(40)
V ar(yjp) = 1
hy + hp
(41)
and equation (11) to solve for  yields equation (12).
A.3 Proof of proposition 1
1. Suppose to the contrary that the issuer does not provide information, and investors do not buy it either.
Expected prots for the issuer will be:
0 = y   
Qhy
If instead the issuer paid the cost of disclosure, expected prots would be:
1 = y   
Q(h + hy)
  
Rearranging the inequality I   0 > 0 yields condition (14). If the condition holds, it contradicts the
assumption that the issuer does not provide information.
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2. If condition (14) does not hold, then 1  0, so an issuer will not disclose if he expects investors not to buy
the report either. But the average price, which is equal to , satises
@
@
=
h   hp + (Q  ) @hp@
(Qhu + h + (Q  )hp)2
 > 0
because
@hp
@
> 0 and h > hp. Therefore if the issuer expects some positive  the prots from not disclosing
are even higher that if he expectes  = 0. This implies that the issuer will not provide a rating regardless of
what he expects investors to do.
A.4 Welfare of investors - proof of propositions 2, 3 and 5
Expected utility conditional on an information set is given by (33). Let
Ai  E [Ei (y)  p]
i  V ar [Ei (y)  p]
Zi  Ei (y)  pp
i
Ex-ante, Zi  N

Aip
i
; 1

.
Rewrite (33) as
EUi =   exp ( (w0   cd)) exp

 1
2
1
V ari (y)
iZ
2
i

Using the formula for the moment-generating function of a chi-square distribution, the ex-ante expected utility is
EU = E(EUi) =   exp ( (w0   cd))
exp

  1
2
Ai
2 1
V ari(y)
1+ 1
V ari(y)
i

q
1 + 1
V ari(y)
i
or, re-normalizing:
Vi   2 log
  EU)
exp ( w0)

=
Ai
2
V ari (y) + i
+ log (V ari (y) + i)  log (V ari (y))  2cd (42)
1. In case the issuer supplies the rating, then, using (8) - (11):
EI (y)  p = x
Q (hy + h)
V arI (y) =
1
hy + h
Therefore
I =


Q (hy + h)
2
1
hx
(43)
AI =
1
Q

hy + h
(44)
2. In case the issuer does not supply the rating and  2 (0; Q), there are two expected utilities to consider, that
of the informed agent and that of the uninformed. But in an interior equilibrium, the two must be equal. So,
it suces to look only at the expected utility of the uninformed agent. Using (8) - (11):
EU (y)  p =
hyy + hp

y    p


hy + hp
  p
= y   +

hp
hy + hp
  

(   y) +

hp
hy + hp
  




V arU (y) =
1
hy + hp
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so
AU =

(hy + h)+ (hy + hp) (Q  ) (45)
U =
"

h
2
1
hx
+

1
hy
+
1
h
#
hp
hy + hp
  h + (Q  )hp
 (hy + h) + (Q  ) (hy + hp)
2
(46)
3. In case the issuer does not supply the rating but in equilibrium  = 0, utility can be found by setting h = 0
in (43) and (44):
0 =


Qhy
2
1
hx
(47)
A0 =
1
Q

hy
(48)
4. Finally, for the case where the issuer does not provide a rating but in equilibrium  = Q, utility for each is as
in the issuer-provided rating, subtracting the xed cost c = 
Q
, so that
VQ = VI   2 
Q
Replacing (47) , (48), (43) and (44) respectively into (42)
V0   VI = 2hx
h 1
Q2hyhx + 2
  1
Q2(hy + h)hx + 2
i
+ log
0B@ 1 + 1hy


Q
2
1
hx
1 + 1
hy+h


Q
2
1
hx
1CA > 0
that is positive because h > 0. This proves Proposition 2.
Now we prove Proposition 3. First, from (45) and (44), it follows that lim!QAU = AI . Second, we use (46),
(43) and (11) to establish the following two claims.
Claim 1 1)
U
I
=
h hp
hy+hp
hy
h
and 2) I   U = hph
hy+h
hy+hp
I
Proof. Let U  lim!Q U =


Qh
2
1
hx
+

1
hy
+ 1
h
 h
hp
hy+hp
  h
hy+h
i2
. Then
U
I
=


Qh
2
1
hx
+

1
hy
+ 1
h
 h
hp
hy+hp
  h
hy+h
i2


Q(hy+h)
2
1
hx
= [2hy +Q
2h2hx +Q
2hhxhy]| {z }
(hy+hp)(2+Q2hhx)
(h   hp)2| {z }
4h2

(2+Q2hhx)
2
hy
1
2h2(hy + hp)
2
=
2hy
(2 +Q2hhx)(hy + hp)
=
h   hp
hy + hp
hy
h
and
I   U =
h
1  h   hp
hy + hp
hy
h
i
I
=
hp
h
hy + h
hy + hp
I
Claim 2 lim!Q
h
1
hy+hp
+U
i
= 1
hy+h
+I
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Proof. Observe that lim!Q hp =
Q2h2hx
2+Q2hhx
. Then:
lim
!Q
h 1
hy + hp
+U
i
=
1
hy + h
+I ,
lim
!Q
1
hy + hp
  1
hy + h
= I   U , (By Claim 1)
lim
!Q
h   hp
(hy + hp)(hy + h)
=
hp
h
hy + h
hy + hp
I ,
lim
!Q
hp
h
h 
Q(hy + h)
i2
=
hp
h
I ,h 
Q(hy + h)
i2
= I
Now we establish the result:
VI   lim
!Q
VU =
 
Q(hy + h)
2h 1
1
hy+h
+I
  11
hy+hp
+U
i
+ log
 1
hy+h
+I
1
hy+hp
+U

+ log
hy + h
hy + hp

By Claim 2, the rst two terms are equal to zero, and since h > hp, we have that:
VI   lim
!Q
VU = log

hy + h
hy + hp

> 0
Therefore, for  suciently close to Q, VI > VU .
Proposition 5 then follows from the fact that for a suciently small , the equilibrium value of  will be Q.
A.5 Proof of proposition 4
Equation (9) and the fact that hp < h imply that  is minimized when  = Q. The result then follows from equation
(16).
A.6 Proof of proposition 6
From (12), a positive solution for  requires
h
(hy + h)(1  exp( 2c))   1 > 0 (49)
which reduces to
h exp ( 2c)  hy (1  exp ( 2c)) > 0 (50)
Since the analyst must make nonnegative prots and at most a measure Q of investors purchase the rating, this
means that c  
Q
. Therefore (50) cannot hold if (17) holds.
A.7 Proof of proposition 7
Rewrite (12) as
 =
p
hhx
vuut h+hyh exp ( 2c)  hyh
h+hy
h
(1  exp ( 2c))
(51)
Fixing c, (51) implies limh!1  = 0. Letting c =


does not alter this conclusion because  is decreasing in c.
Therefore, with an endogenous information price, the right side approaches zero even faster.
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Even though  = 0 in the limit, it could still be that for any nite h,  > 0. The following shows that this is
not the case.
Suppose not. This means that for every h (51) has a solution  2 (0; Q] with c =  . Rearrange (51) and use
c = 

:
p
h =
1

p
hx
vuuut

1 +
hy
h

exp
  2

  hy
h
1 +
hy
h
  
1  exp   2

 :
Since the previous expression holds for every h, by continuity it should also hold in the limit as h ! 1. On the
LHS we have that limh!1
p
h =1. On the RHS, we have that:
lim
h!1
1

p
hx
s
exp
  2

 
1  exp   2

 = p
hx
lim
!0
s
1
2 exp
 
2

  1
where the right hand side considers  a function of h (limh!1 (h) = 0). Finally, L'Hopital's rule tells us that
lim!02 exp
 
2


=1, and therefore (52) is zero in the limit.
Therefore, we have two sequences that must be equal for all nite values but are dierent in the limit. Since
these two sequences come from continuous functions, this is a contradiction.
A.8 Proof of proposition 8
Welfare for any given investor is given by
Vi = 2iw0   2icd+ A
2
i
V ari (y) + i
+ log

1 +
i
V ari (y)

(52)
where
Ai  E [Ei (y)  p]
i  V ar [Ei (y)  p]
1. When the issuer discloses, we have
AI =
1
(hy + h) 
(53)
I =

1
(hy + h) 
2
1
hx
(54)
V arI (y) =
1
hy + h
(55)
where
 
QZ
0
1
i
di
When there is no information, we have
A0 =
1
hy 
(56)
0 =

1
hy 
2
1
hx
(57)
V ar0 (y) =
1
hy
(58)
so replacing (53)-(58) into (52) and rearranging yields V0 > VI .
2. For i ! Q, the values of Ai, i and V ari (y) for an informed investor converge to (55), so for an investor
who would have bought the analyst reaport, mandatory disclosure implies an increase in utility of 2ic. An
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investor who would not have bought the analyst report would have
lim
i!Q
AU =
1
(hy + h) 
(59)
lim
i!Q
U =

hp
hy + hp
  h
hy + h)
2 "
1
h
+
1
hy

+

1
 Lh
2
1
hx
#
(60)
lim
i!Q
V arU (y) =
1
hy + hp
(61)
Replacing (59)-(61) into (52) and following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 3 leads to limi!Q VU <
VI .
3. This follows from the fact that for a suciently small , the equilibrium value of i will be Q.
A.9 Proof of proposition 9
Given that in equilibrium investors rationally expect the level of investment k, the only eect of the investment
decision on the subsequent nancial market game is to make the level of y endogenous. Propositions 2, 3 and 5
hold because none of the terms in equation (42) depend on y. Proposition 4 holds because  does not depend on y.
Propositions 6 and 7 hold because  does not depend on y.
A.10 Proof of proposition 10
The proof is identical to that of Proposition 1, except that
0 = f(k(0))  
Qhy
  k(0)1 = f(k(1))  
Q(h + hy)
  k(1)  
B Data
Adjusting for uctuations in the risk-free rate. We compute the spread as follows: By denition,
the yield of the bond at the issue date, rb0 satises
p0 =
TX
t=0
ct 
1 + rb0
t
where ct is the bond's t-dated coupon (or coupon-plus-principal). The spread on the bond is
s0 = r0   rT0
(where rT0 is the T -maturity risk-free rate as of t = 0). At t = 1, instead of looking directly at the price of the bond,
we look at a corrected price dened by
~p1 =
TX
t=0
ct
(1 + rT0 + s1)
t
where s1 is the spread calculated on the basis of the t = 1 price. If r
T
0 = r
T
1 , the corrected price coincides with the
pure price, but if risk-free interest rates have changed in the meantime, the corrected price lters out the eect.
Normalizing by the promised value. In order to account for the dierent contractual terms of dierent
bonds, we normalize the price of bonds by the contractually-promised net present value yp, dened by
yp =
TX
t=0
ct
(1 + rT0 )
t
For bonds with low probability of default (for instance, highly rated bonds), their price as a proportion of the
contractually promised net present value (p=yp) will be close to one. In our data, the average p=yp is 0:91.
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C Model with Public Signal
Suppose there was a public signal w that everyone could see in addition to the rating.
w = y +  with   N

0;
1
hw

:
The equilibrium price will have the form:
p = +  +  (   f) +  (w   f)
Solving for the coecients:
 = f   
 (hy + hw + h) + (Q  ) (hy + hw + hp)
 =

h
h + (Q  )hp
 (hy + hw + h) + (Q  ) (hy + hw + hp) (62)
 =
h + (Q  )hp
 (hy + hw + h) + (Q  ) (hy + hw + hp)
 =
hw
 (hy + hw + h) + (Q  ) (hy + hw + hp)
Assuming that the data comes from the model with publicly observable ratings ( = Q), this reduces to
 = f   
Q (hy + hw + h)
 =

Q (hy + hw + h)
 =
h
hy + hw + h
 =
hw
hy + hw + h
Deriving ve moments Next, we derive each of the ve moments that we match to data.
1. Unconditional variance of bond payo. This is the variance of output, which is, by assumption,
V ar (y) =
1
hy
: (63)
2. Price variance. The variance of the price can be computed using the equilibrium price equation
p = +  +  (   f) +  (w   f)
= +  + ( + )u+  + 
V ar (p) = 2
1
hx
+ ( + )2
1
hy
+ 2
1
h
+ 2
1
hw
=

1
hy + hw + h
2 "

Q
2
1
hx
+
(h + hw)
2
hy
+ h + hw
#
(64)
3. Average excess return. The excess return in the model is
y   p = y         (   f)   (w   f)
= f + u        (u+ )   (u+ )
so
y   p = u+ 
Q (hy + hw + h)
  
Q
1
hy + hw + h
   h
hy + hw + h
(u+ )  hw
hy + hw + h
(u+ )
=

Q (hy + hw + h)
  
Q
1
hy + hw + h
   h
hy + hw + h
   hw
hy + hw + h
 +
hy
hy + hw + h
u
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and therefore the average excess return is
E [y   p] = 
Q (hy + hw + h)
(65)
4. Informativeness of prices. The standard formula for the R2 in a regression of y on p is
R2 =
Cov (y; p)2
V ar (y)V ar (p)
We can compute this covariance by rewriting price p as a function of the unexpected component of the bond
payo u:
p = +  +  (   f) +  (w   f)
= +  + ( + )u+  + :
Since y = f(k) + u and f(k) is a known constant,
Cov (y; p) = ( + )
1
hy
:
Using this covariance formula and the formulae for the unconditional variances (63) and (64),
R2 =
( + )2

1
hy
2
1
hy

1
hy+hw+h
2 

Q
2
1
hx
+ (h+hw)
2
hy
+ h + hw

=
1

(h+hw)Q
2
hy
hx
+ 1 +
hy
h+hw
(66)
5. Informativeness of ratings. The standard formula for the R2 in a regression of y on  is
R2 =
Cov (; y)2
V ar (y)V ar ()
=
V ar (y)2
V ar (y) [V ar (y) + V ar ()]
=
1
1 +
hy
h
(67)
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